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Abstract 
Innovative theories and policy proposals originating in the economics profession have diffused 
globally over the past several decades, but these models and policy programs are transformed as 
they spread.  Existing models of change based on the concept of “paradigm shifts” capture the 
transformation of the economics profession at a high level of abstraction, but analysis of more 
concrete policy changes and associated ideas requires developing theory at a lower level of 
abstraction.  I propose field theoretical model of change based on the concept of cycles of 
polarization and settlement.  According to this model, settlements are characterized by multiple 
cross-cutting axes of competition and debate in a professional field.  Moments of contention 
emerge when field entrepreneurs successfully build professional movements, resulting in 
polarization.  However, contention is episodic and followed by the emergence of “centripetal 
forces” which lead a gradual return to the center.  I develop this model by examining the case of 
monetary economics and policy in Latin America, a critical case for studies of the policy 
influence of economic ideas and experts. 
 
Keywords: field theory, economic ideas, Latin American economics, monetary policy, 
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The transformation, globalization and increasing prominence of the economics profession has 
paralleled the global spread of “neoliberal” policies in recent decades (Babb 2001; Bockman 
2011; Chwieroth 2007; Fourcade 2006, 2009).  As a result, many authors suggest that economic 
experts and the ideas they produce and promote have played a role in this policy transformation, 
often acting as senior officials in central banks, international organizations and other state 
institutions (Bockman & Eyal, 2002; Campbell & Pederson, 2001; Chwieroth, 2010; Fourcade-
Gourinchas & Babb, 2002; Hall, 1990; Kogut & Macpherson, 2007; c.f. Hall 1989).  While 
debate continues over whether the economics profession and economic ideas have an 
autonomous impact on policy (Prasad 2006), there seems to be some agreement that experts can 
at minimum shape the speed and inflect the direction of policy change in particular institutional 
and political contexts.1  This is particularly true in the developing world, where weak (or non-
existent) democratic institutions create space for “technocratic” forms of government.  Thus, 
understanding the policy implications of economic ideas and the transformation of these ideas 
over time is an important task for economic and political sociology.   
Efforts to assess the political influence of economic ideas often take the form of historical 
analyses of new or emergent “paradigms” which spread from academic to political spheres.  For 
example, in a seminal contribution, Peter Hall examined the impact of “monetarism” – an 
academic theory and policy program prominently associated with the economist Milton 
Friedman – and its role in the neoliberal policy shift in the United Kingdom under Thatcher (Hall 
1990, 1993).  Since Hall’s work, many researchers have examined the impact of monetarism, 
rational expectations theory, and the resurgence of “neoclassical” economics more generally in 
diverse countries and policy arenas (Babb 2001; Blyth 2002; Chwieroth 2010; Fourcade-
Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Lindvall 2009).  To extent that goal of these studies is to understand 
the political impact of changes within the economics profession, these studies (implicitly or 
explicitly) examine the diffusion of ideas from the academic to the political sphere.  However, 
diffusion studies of this kind confront a basic difficulty.  As economic theories and policy 
programs are exported to the political arena, they often evolve beyond their original meaning.  
As Fourcade (2006: 155) puts it, “diffusion is a multifaceted process, involving ideas, actors and 
organizations coevolving in the very process of diffusion.”  The diffusion process is even more 
complex when it involves the export of ideas across international borders.  Therefore, rather than 
attempting to track a static object, research in this area needs a coherent model of how ideas 
change as they are exported across both institutional realms and international borders. 
This paper proposes such a model , building on recent theorizations of professional, institutional 
and field dynamics (Abbott 2001; Bourdieu 2004; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Martin 2003; 
Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003).  I suggest that the emergence and diffusion of innovative policy 
programs follows a cyclical pattern of polarization and settlement.  New policy programs are 
often introduced by professional movements which adopt “ruptural” strategies, framing their 
innovations as “revolutions” in order to gain adherents and policy influence.  These strategies 
lead to heightened contention marked by professional classification struggles that often become 
entangled with broader political conflicts.  This results in polarization and the formation of 
antagonistic professional identities.  However, when a professional movement achieves policy 
influence, the practical and political realities of implementing a policy program mean that victory 
                                                          
1 Even Prasad, who is skeptical about the impact of ideas, notes that the French trajectory towards neoliberalism was 
influenced by structures that “subordinated political conflict…to academic expertise” (2006:23). 
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is usually ephemeral.  As professional actors initially allied with the professional movement take 
on policy-making roles, their commitment to polarizing professional identities and revolutionary 
claims fades.  At the same time, within the academic arena, others begin to synthesize the 
innovations of the revolutionaries with earlier approaches.  The emergence of these centripetal 
forces leads to a “return to the center” in which revolutionary claims are synthesized with older 
claims and the polarization of professional identities declines.  The outcome is a new 
professional settlement as debates disperse across multiple dimensions and professional 
contention is routinized. 
I develop this model of change by examining developments in monetary economics since the 
1970s as they diffused both from academic to policymaking arenas and transnationally.  This 
empirical object is composed of interrelated sets of individual economists and policymakers, 
causal claims, professional identities, and policy programs.  Monetarism and rational 
expectations theory were associated with a revolutionary professional movement that formed at 
the University of Chicago in the 1970s and sought to wrest both dominance in the academic 
sphere and policy influence from the existing Keynesian settlement.  However, over the course 
of the 1980s and 1990s, the apparent paradigmatic battle between Keynesianism and monetarism 
petered out, giving rise to the New Keynesianism and a diffuse network of “open economy” 
macroeconomists.  These later developments reflect the synthesis of the revolutionary claims of 
Chicago economists in the 1970s with earlier Keynesian elements, reflecting a “return to the 
center” that followed an episode of professional polarization. 
In order to capture the international diffusion and transformation of these ideas, I examine their 
influence in Latin American, focusing on Mexico and Argentina.  This joint focus on a particular 
policy domain and region is especially relevant for several reasons.  First, among policy areas, 
monetary policy is a critical case, since it has been central to the transformation of 
macroeconomics since the 1970s.  High inflation and stagflation were central to the oft-cited 
“crisis of Keynesianism” and the rising influence of monetarism.  Second, Latin America is 
revealing because a long history of high inflation made the region a unique “laboratory” for 
monetary economists.  Moreover, as previous literature has documented (Babb 2001; Biglaiser 
2002; Dezalay and Garth 2002; Montecinos and Markoff 2010), the economics profession has 
strongly institutionalized channels of policy influence in the region.  The case of monetary 
economics thus presents an opportunity to study the impact of economic ideas in a context in 
which professionals enjoy significant policy influence.  Finally, failed monetary experiments led 
to deep economic crises with profound effects on inequality and poverty throughout the region, 
so the case is highly relevant to the study of development. 
The next section briefly reviews the “paradigm shift” model developed by Peter Hall and 
describes some limitations as it applies to the monetary policy domain.  I then develop the model 
of cycles of polarization and settlement.  Finally, after briefly introducing the historical sources 
used, I review the trajectory of change in the area of monetary policy from the 1970s through the 
mid-2000s.  The conclusion considers some broader implications for institutional and field 
analysis. 
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From paradigms to policy programs 
In his classic work on the impact of monetarism, Peter Hall borrowed Thomas Kuhn’s concept of 
“paradigm shifts” to describe the radical transformation of policies and economic ideas under 
Thatcher (Hall 1990, 1993).  Hall conceptualized paradigms as “worldviews,” defined as “the 
overarching framework of ideas that structures policy-making in a particular field” (Babb 2001; 
Campbell 2002, 2004; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Hall 1990).  According to Hall, 
these worldviews “[define] the broad goals behind policy, the related problems or puzzles that 
policy-makers have to solve to get there, and…the kind of instruments that can be used to attain 
these goals” (ibid).  Adapting Kuhn’s concept of “normal science,” Hall argued that in periods of 
relative paradigmatic stability, policy changes are incremental and limited by the taken for 
granted worldviews of policymakers (1990: 60).  When these institutionalized policy paradigms 
confront unresolved anomalies, competing paradigms take over after a period of open 
competition, becoming rapidly institutionalized.  Hall described these shifts as “third order 
change,” or a fundamental shift in policy goals. 
Since Hall, many authors have invoked this conceptualization of paradigm shifts (Babb 2001, 
2012; Campbell 2004; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Maman and Rosenhek 2009).  
However, this literature has often analyzed paradigms at a high level of abstraction, as a broadly 
pro-market “worldview” – often labeled “neoliberal” or “orthodox” – in contrast to Hall’s focus 
on a paradigm directly derived from academic economics (that is, monetarism).  For example, 
Babb notes that while the Washington consensus – conceptualized as a paradigm – “was clearly 
related to trends within the economics profession, it could not be traced to any particular school 
of thought: it was neither precisely ‘monetarist’ not exactly ‘Chicago School,’ but more vaguely 
promarket” (2001: 10).  Many authors use the term “neoclassical” to describe this paradigm 
(Babb 2001; Campbell 1998), suggesting a connection with academic economics but also a more 
diffuse ideology than monetarism.  This analysis is consistent with Hall’s conceptualization of 
paradigms as “worldviews,” but leaves the role of specific economic theories, models and 
concepts – such as monetarism and the “new classical” economics – somewhat ambiguous.  For 
example, while Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb (2002) note that monetarist reformers played a 
key role in the market reform process in Chile, they see the new paradigm as a broader pro-
market worldview ultimately rooted in financial globalization.  Thus, somewhat ironically, a 
literature that began by asking “how…the knowledge generated by social science come[s] to 
influence public policy” (Hall 1990: 53) has in many cases shied away from the idea that specific 
academic ideas define policy paradigms. 
At this level of analysis, this worldview-oriented conceptualization of paradigm shifts performs 
well.  There is little debate that policymakers in many developing countries increasingly came to 
think in broadly pro-market terms during the 1980s and 1990s.  However, this conceptualization 
limits analysis to this high level of abstraction.  “Worldviews” are slippery empirical objects, and 
their relationship to concrete policies is ambiguous.  A given policy may be compatible with 
multiple worldviews and, conversely, different policies may fit within the same worldview.  For 
example, financial liberalization may seem a logical corollary of a pro-market worldview, and 
indeed briefly seemed poised to become part of the “Washington consensus” (Chwieroth 2010).  
However, within the economics profession, financial liberalization was always more 
controversial than trade liberalization; many otherwise pro-market economists oppose 
indiscriminate financial liberalization (Bhagwati 1998; c.f. Chwieroth 2010).  This raises the 
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question: do economists and policymakers defend trade liberalization, for example, because they 
hold a “broadly pro-market worldview,” or is it because they subscribe to specific set of causal 
claims regarding the relationship between trade, economic growth and development?  If the 
latter, conceptualizing the ideas of economists in terms of a broadly pro-market paradigm limits 
the scope of analysis.  More generally, recent studies have suggested that the apparent pro-
market bias of the economics profession is highly context-dependent (Bockman 2011; Reay 
2012).   
A second, overlapping literature has analyzed economic ideas using the paradigm shift logic at a 
much lower level of abstraction, situating monetary policy developments within neoliberalism.  
These authors argue that a commitment to low inflation, and a corollary downgrading of growth 
and unemployment as policy goals, are key components of the “neoliberal paradigm” (Blyth 
2002; Maman and Rosenhek 2009; McNamara 1998).2  For example, Maman and Roshenek 
argue that the inflation targeting policy program (a key case discussed below) embodies “a broad 
shift from a Keynesian to a neo-liberal policy paradigm” and a fundamental shift of policy goals 
from growth and employment to low inflation (Maman and Rosenhek 2009: 220-221; c.f. 
Kirshner 1999).  Many other authors contrast a “Keynesian” approach to inflation that balanced 
price stability and employment policy goals with “neoliberal” (Babb 2007) or “monetarist” 
(Lindvall 2009) approaches that emphasize inflation and disregard growth.  Though the latter 
accounts do not always employ the “paradigm shift” language, they are consistent with a “third 
order change,” or a shift in policy goals from growth to inflation. 
However, this lower level of analysis is in tension with the conceptualization of paradigms as 
“overarching worldviews” characterized by broadly pro-market ideology.  This is because, first, 
debates about monetary policy are only indirectly about the role of “the market;” monetary 
policy inevitably involves state intervention, whether the goal of intervention is low inflation, 
economic growth, or both.  The difference between “Keynesian” and “monetarist” approaches to 
monetary policy is derived as much, if not more, from specific causal claims as it is from beliefs 
about the “free market.”  Second, as this paper will show, accounts that frame paradigm shifts in 
terms of “third order change” (that is, change in policy goals) have exaggerated the extent to 
which monetary policy goals have changed as a result of new economic ideas.  This is both 
because of the heterogeneity of policy goals associated field settlements and because the change 
achieved by the professional movement was less dramatic than its aspirations.  
For purposes of analyzing the diffusion, transformation and impact of innovative monetary 
policy programs, therefore, it is useful to develop a model pitched at a lower level of abstraction.  
This lower level of abstraction is based on policy programs rather than paradigms.  In contrast to 
paradigms-as-worldviews, policy programs are “precise causal…ideas that…[specify] how to 
solve particular policy problems” (Campbell 2002: 28).  For example, free market ideology is a 
“paradigm” or worldview, but as a policy program monetarism consisted of causal claims (for 
example, regarding the relationship between inflation and unemployment) and an associated 
policy prescription (inflation could be stopped by targeting a constant rate of growth in the 
money supply).   
                                                          
2 Blyth (2002) does not employ the language of paradigm shifts, but he explicitly argues that monetarism triumphed 
in the 1970s and remained dominant (see p 171-172, especially footnote 78). 
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To summarize, the concept of paradigm shifts works well at a high level of abstraction to 
describe a broad shift in policy thinking in many developing countries since the 1970s.  As an 
account of the influence of specific innovations in the economics profession, the paradigm shift 
model is less useful.  This is particularly true with regards to monetary economics, which were 
central to changes in the both academia and policy-making.  Given these limitations, it is useful 
to develop an model pitched at the level of policy programs, rather than paradigms. 
Cycles of polarization and settlement 
Theorists working in a variety of  different sociological traditions have recently turned towards 
the dynamics of institutionalized fields, including professions and academic disciplines (Abbott 
2001; Bourdieu 2004; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Rao et al. 2003).  The key concepts in this 
model – including classification struggles, professional movements, polarization, field 
settlements, and synthesis – are borrowed from this work, but the overall model is a synthesis 
and extension of various strands of field theory, broadly defined.  The goal of this framework is 
not to introduce a general theory of field dynamics, but rather to address a much more focused 
question: how do policy programs originating within academia change as they diffuse to the 
political sphere and across international boundaries?  Therefore, this model refers to policy-
oriented macroeconomics rather than the economics profession as a whole. 
Central to this model is the concept of national and transnational fields of macroeconomic policy 
expertise  (c.f. Bockman and Eyal 2002; Fourcade 2006, 2009).  This field is constituted by 
actors holding professional credentials (such as a Ph.D. in economics) and working within 
central banks, finance ministries and international financial institutions (such as the IMF), as 
well as universities, think tanks, and other organizations that specialize in the production of 
policy knowledge.  These diverse organizations agglomerate into two overlapping arenas: an 
academic arena in which actors compete to shape the distribution of professional opinion, and a 
policy arena in which actors compete for policy influence.  Because of the close connections 
between these arenas, theoretical and academic developments cannot be disentangled from more 
applied policy developments.  Clearly, however, policy-making imposes political and practical 
constraints different from those of academia.  In this paper I assume that the macroeconomic 
policy field is relatively autonomous – that is, that its dynamics are governed partially by 
“autonomous” criteria, such as professional prestige, but that “heteronomous” criteria such as 
broader ideological and partisan conflicts also play a role.  This amounts to an assumption that 
monetary policy-making cannot be fully reduced to party politics or ideology. 
From worldview to settlement 
A first starting point is the observation that competing policy programs coexist rather than 
succeeding one another in time (as implied by the notion of a paradigm shift from Keynesianism 
to monetarism).  For example, Keynesianism encompassed both a policy program of “fine 
tuning” to balance full employment and low inflation (associated most prominently with the 
Kennedy Council of Economic Advisers), and a more “orthodox” program of fiscal and 
monetary austerity in response to high inflation (associated with the International Monetary 
Fund).  Although the latter was often branded “monetarism” by critics, the IMF’s staff 
economists in fact strongly identified as Keynesians during the 1960s (Babb 2007).  A first step, 
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therefore, is to recognize that multiple policy programs are compatible with a label like 
“Keynesianism.”  Moreover, heterogeneous causal ideas are often compatible with the same 
policy program.  The distribution of beliefs regarding these causal ideas and policy programs 
make up a field’s “idea space,” the abstract, “objective,” birds-eye view mapping of the available 
positions (the “space of possibles,” in Bourdieu’s [2004] terms).  This space is not limited to one 
or two dimensions, but rather is characterized by a multiple dimensions of various degrees of 
salience.   
Second, categories such as “Keynesian” and “monetarist” are professional identities rather than 
fixed sets of causal ideas, policy programs or institutionalized schools.  Professional identities 
are systems of classification that players in a field rely on to organize their mental maps of the 
space of possibles, define their own professional identities, and construct boundaries between 
themselves and competitors.  In the process, they engage in professional classification struggles 
(Bourdieu 1991), efforts to define the dominant professional identity within the field.  This set of 
categories constitutes the “social space” of a field, which may be only very loosely coupled with 
its “idea space.”  The existence of schools as social entities should therefore not be taken for 
granted; more often, players with similar identities constitute diffuse networks rather than 
socially closed groups. 
Thus, it is necessary to go beyond the one-dimensional and dichotomous view of the idea space 
of policy-oriented economics imposed by binary categories such “Keynesian” and “monetarist” 
or “neoclassical.”  In fact, many professionals cannot be classified neatly into schools, either as 
institutionally identifiable groups or clear-cut professional identities.  Many, perhaps most, actors 
occupy positions and form professional identities somewhere between the extreme poles of the 
field’s idea space.  These poles are most likely to be noticed and named precisely because their 
extremity renders them visible.  In contrast, the “unmarked” center is largely invisible (Brekhus 
1998).  The positions of those “in the middle” tend to be mis-recognized in ways that depend on 
the location of the perceiver. 3  This asymmetry is a general property of classification struggles: 
to those on the left, centrists are “on the right” while the same individuals are “on the left” in the 
eyes of the right.  This misrecognition is not merely a byproduct of “mistakes” but is also a 
reflection of the “subjective” perceptions of actors within a field itself: actors “know their own 
kin well” but tend to conflate the positions of those further away in idea space (Abbott 2001: 11).  
This asymmetric “worm’s eye view” perception leads to a systematic misclassification of those 
in the center.  For all of these reasons, we need to be cautious about taking acts of categorization 
as objective descriptions of the locations of competitors in a field.  Classification tells us more 
about the categorizer than the categorized. 
Rather than understand such categories as fixed entities, I suggest that they are features of 
temporary settlements.  Field settlements represent a “generalized sense of order” and stability in 
competition – though not the absence of conflict (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 22-3).  During 
periods of settlement, multiple axes of competition and debate – representing policy programs, 
causal claims, and broader ideological or partisan divisions – are loosely correlated.  As a result, 
actors move towards the center of the field, and struggles over professional identities are of 
relatively low salience.  Thus, settlements reflect the absence of a single, overarching dimension 
of the social space constituting the fundamental axis of conflict in a field.  Settlement does not 
                                                          
3 Misrecognition refers to an act of social classification which either accidentally or deliberately imputes a position 
in social space to an actor which does not occur with that actor’s “objective” position in abstract idea space. 
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imply benign professional consensus, though actors may attempt to portray it as one, but rather 
the normalization of competition and contention. 
Cycles of polarization and settlement 
Sociologists have recently begun draw on social movement theory to analyze the emergence and 
transformation of fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).  One variant of this approach is the study 
of professional movements, collective action within professional fields to alter the distribution of 
professional opinion, action and status within a field (Rao et al. 2003).  The concept of 
professional movements is well suited to the macroeconomic policy field, with its dual academic 
and policy arenas.4  One implication of this literature is that actors disadvantaged by existing 
distributions of professional opinion and identity form movements in the effort to change these 
distributions and transform a field.  Because framing new ideas and policy programs as 
incremental modifications on existing professional opinion is unlikely to recruit allies and 
galvanize change, movement entrepreneurs often present their claims as “revolutionary” 
transformations.  For example, within the economics profession, terms such as the “monetarist 
counter-revolution” (Friedman 1970) and “rational expectations revolution” (Begg 1982) were 
used self-consciously by advocates of these movements, much as the phrase “Keynesian 
revolution” (Klein 1947) had been used a generation before.  Invocations of revolution should 
thus be understood as strategies intended to recruit allies to a professional movement, rather than 
objective descriptions of actual change.5   
If movement entrepreneurs successfully recruit a critical mass of allies, an episode of contention 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 21-22) begins.6  The professional movement mobilizes around a 
collective identity (such as “monetarism”), causal claims and a policy program.  If competitors 
submit to the revolutionary gambit – that is, if they accept the movement’s terms of the 
classification struggle, defending existing professional identities and opposing the movement’s 
identity – competing groups holding adversarial professional identities form.  Because a field’s 
“idea space” is multi-dimensional this is not a necessary outcome: incumbents who adhere to the 
existing professional identity, or new entrants who enter in the midst of a revolutionary 
movement, can side-step this classification struggle by emphasizing other dimensions.  Indeed, 
as I point out below, many new entrants do exactly this, giving rise to centripetal forces that 
eventually undermine polarization.  Nevertheless, a successful professional movement succeeds 
in inducing, for a time, a broad correlation across a number of salient dimensions, creating the 
appearance of incommensurable paradigms.  This process of polarization “induces alignment 
along multiple lines of potential conflict and organizes individuals and groups around exclusive 
identities, thus crystalizing interests into opposite factions” (Baldassari and Gelman 2008; c.f. 
Flache and Macy 2011).  For example, Milton Friedman’s monetarist revolution (fought on the 
dimension of monetary policy) was most successful when it aligned with the methodological 
revolution of rational expectations theory.  Though monetarism and rational expectations were 
                                                          
4 Professional movements share many characteristics with “intellectual movements” (Frickel and Gross 2005), but a 
key difference is that professional movements seek influence in the policy arena as well as the academy. 
5 This is not to deny that the work of Keynes or Friedman represented major changes within economics: they clearly 
did, but the concept of “revolution” may be misleading.   
6 While Fligstein and McAdam argue that contention generally emerges in response to exogenous shocks, I am 
agnostic on this point.  As discussed below, exogenous shocks did play a key role in creating an opportunity for the 
monetarist professional movement, but the movement itself preceded them. 
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not intrinsically linked by an overarching framework or paradigm, they became socially linked 
through the crystallization of multiple dimensions of competition and debate.7    
Professional movements reach the peak of their influence when exogenous circumstances create 
windows of political opportunity that allow movement entrepreneurs to recruit allies in the 
policy sphere.  When this happens, “autonomous” professional struggles become correlated with 
“heteronomous” (Bourdieu 2004) political divisions, such as partisan and ideological rifts.  For 
example, in the US and UK, contention in the macroeconomic policy field became particularly 
acute when the monetarist-versus-Keynesian rift aligned with broader partisan conflicts.  This 
alignment gives the professional movement a critical lever to achieve policy influence as, for 
example, the alignment of “monetarism” with “Thatcherism” gave the professional movement a 
means to recruit allies in the policy arena.  At its peak, a profession movement may achieve both 
academic and policy dominance.  In macroeconomics, the mathematical sophistication of the 
anti-Keynesian rational expectations movement succeeded in displacing the hitherto dominant 
Keynesian identity, as well as the causal claims associated with it; in parallel, the causal claims 
associated with monetarism became the operating logic of central banks in the US and UK.  
These policy victories probably reflect “exogenous” political factors in addition to “autonomous” 
professional developments, but in a policy domain like monetary policy, professional support for 
central banks’ causal claims certainly facilitates the adoption of innovative policy programs.  
However, two key mechanisms counteract the tendency towards polarization and produce 
centripetal forces that lead a “return to the center” (Heilbroner and Milberg 1995).  First, within 
the academic arena, once a revolutionary professional movement has peaked, professional 
rewards shift to actors who engage in synthetic strategies.  While revolutionary professional 
entrepreneurs and their allies benefit from presenting themselves as a professional vanguard, 
late-comers to the revolution are seen as simply jumping on the bandwagon.  In contrast, 
synthesis of seeming opposites is often a profitable strategy (Abbott 2001).  For example, the 
“New Keynesian” economics was the result of synthesis of rational expectations tools originally 
formulated as a radical critique of Keynesianism (e.g. Lucas and Sargent 1979) with older 
Keynesian causal claims (Mankiw 1990).  This synthesis begins to disaggregate the multiple 
dimensions of the field’s idea space, reducing the correlation among these dimensions and thus 
the polarization of professional identities.  For example, as New Keynesians demonstrated that 
rational expectations methodology could be shown to support Keynesian causal claims, the 
alignment between of the methodological and monetary policy dimensions declined.   
Second, the “messiness” of policy implementation inevitably complicates revolutionaries’ early 
successes, resulting in further debate and opening up additional dimensions of the idea space.  In 
economics, the early success of monetarists in influencing policy (for example, the adoption of 
money supply targeting at the Federal Reserve) was stymied by the difficulty of applying 
Friedman’s policy prescriptions in practice (Krippner 2011).  The practical and political 
challenges of policy implementation tend to blur the sharp boundaries created during 
polarization.  Committed “revolutionaries” who cling to purity become less relevant to practical 
policymaking.  As the challenges of implementing revolutionary policy programs become clear, 
hybrid policy programs emerge which graft elements of insurgent programs onto existing or ad 
                                                          
7 The absence of an intrinsic affinity linking monetarism and rational expectations is suggeted by Friedman’s 
methodological proximity to the institutionalists, the erstwhile opponents of neoclassical economics in the 1930s 
(Stapleford 2011; c.f. Fourcade 2009: 96). 
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hoc forms.  For example, inflation targeting – a policy program discussed below – originated 
within the policy-making arena but drew support from the causal claims developed in the 
academic arena.   
As centripetal forces gather momentum, the professional movement that instigated the 
polarization cycle begins to dissolve.  A second generation of entrants to the field finds the 
antagonistic identities associated with the revolutionary movement counterproductive and 
abandon classification struggles.  If hybrid policy programs are perceived as successful, a new 
settlement begins to form around them.  Causal claims originating in the academic arena provide 
professional support for these new policy programs, contributing to their diffusion.  Throughout 
this process, the distribution of causal claims and policy prescriptions – the field’s “idea space” – 
may or may not change; what changes is the correlation between different dimensions of 
professional differentiation.  As the crystallization of a single overarching dimension erodes, 
professional competition and contention are normalized: debates persist but no longer take on the 
appearance of competing paradigms.    
This is not to imply that revolutionary movements do not accomplish any change.   Across cycles 
of contention and settlement, the strategies of professional entrepreneurs shift the field’s center 
of gravity.  For example, the New Keynesian synthesis pulled the field in the direction of certain 
monetarist conclusions.  Hybrid policy programs such as inflation targeting embed causal claims 
derived from the revolutionary movement.  Thus this model does not imply an absence of 
change, but it does suggest that change is incremental and occurs through synthesis, rather than 
the wholesale adoption of a new paradigm.   
The transformation of monetary economics and policy 
This model of cycles of polarization and settlement was derived inductively from a historical 
analysis of macroeconomic policy in Latin America from the 1970s through the mid-2000s, 
focusing on Mexico and Argentina alongside developments in the US-centered economics 
profession and Washington-based international organizations.  Although the aim of this paper is 
to develop theory, rather than test hypotheses, these two cases illustrate heterogeneous pathways 
which share the basic features of the polarization-settlement cycle.  These cases also illustrate 
how the same policy programs are embedded in different classification struggles (i.e. are 
associated with different professional identities) and result in polarization in one context but not 
another.  However, the structure of this account is transnational, rather than comparative.  The 
account draws on a range of primary sources cited throughout, including published economics 
literature8 and interviews with economists and policymakers involved in monetary policy in 
Latin America.9   
                                                          
8 Since the topic of this article is the transformation of the economics profession, I consider published literature as 
primary data in this context.   
9 In total, I conducted 100 interviews with policymakers from Mexico, Argentina and the International Monetary 
Fund between 2006 and 2010 as a part of a broader study of macroeconomic policy-making in Latin America.  
Interviews were open-ended and focused on particular policy-making decisions.  In the case of Argentina, I also 
draw on recorded interviews housed at the Oral History Archive at the Instituto Gino Germani of the University of 
Buenos Aires.  The conclusions of this paper grew in large part inductively out of surprising moments in these 
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The empirical narrative centers on four distinct moments in the evolving debates over monetary 
policy from the 1970s onwards.  Each moment is analytically distinct but also related to its 
predecessors.  Table 1 summarizes the main professional identities, representative causal claims, 
policy programs and illustrative key figures central to each moment of the narrative.   
[Table 1 about here] 
The contentious 1970s: Monetarism and professional polarization 
In order to understand the revolutionary movement within economics and the subsequent return 
to the center, it is necessary to begin with a brief discussion of preceding the Keynesian 
settlement.  In the monetary domain, an important feature of this settlement was the Phillips 
curve, the inverse empirical relationship between inflation and employment (Babb 2007; 
Campbell 1998; Hall 1993; Kirshner 1998; Maman and Rosenhek 2009).  This relationship 
implied that monetary policy had causal effects on both inflation and economic growth, and that 
policy-makers therefore faced a trade-off between low inflation and full employment.  These 
causal claims underpinned the policy program of “exploiting” this tradeoff through “fine-
tuning.”   This policy program probably prevailed only for a brief time in the United States, 
during the apogee of Keynesian influence under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, but it 
assumed a central role in subsequent debates.  
However, in Latin America, the “fine tuning” policy program was never adopted systematically.  
Far more relevant to the monetary policy of the 1950s and 1960s – and subsequent debates – was 
the macroeconomic model associated with the International Monetary Fund, known as the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments.  Though often denounced as “monetarist” by the 
IMF’s critics (particularly once monetarism became a salient professional identity in the 1960s), 
the Fund’s staff explicitly identified as Keynesians (Babb 2007; Polak 1957; 2001).  Their 
“monetary approach” drew on causal claims (in particular the quantity theory of money)10 
similar to those presented as anti-Keynesian by Milton Friedman, but staff economists saw no 
contradiction between these claims and their commitment to a Keynesian professional identity.11  
The identity and causal claims of the Fund’s staff are indicative of the settled nature of the field 
in the 1950s and 60s: claims that would later become polarizing appeared compatible.  By the 
same token, the Keynesian settlement accommodated both “orthodox” policies of fiscal and 
monetary austerity in the face of inflation in Latin America, and growth-oriented fine tuning in 
the US.  In other words, multiple causal ideas and policy programs were associated with the 
Keynesian professional identity. 
In the 1960s, this settlement came under direct attack from small group of economists at the 
University of Chicago (Blyth 2002; Dezalay and Garth 2002; Fourcade 2009), who held 
professional identities antagonistic to Keynesianism.  One of the leaders of this movement, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interviews.  However, it is not the goal of this paper to exploit these interviews for the purposes of testing theory; for 
this reason, the paper draws sparingly on the interviews for the purpose of illustrating key points. 
10 The quantity theory of money states, to greatly simplify, that the rate of inflation is a function of the size of the 
money supply. 
11 As the IMF’s chief economist put it, “it might be asked whether, in the assumptions made about money [in his 
approach], the Quantity Theory of Money does not rear its barely disguised head?  Suffice it to say…first, that the 
monster was never really slain; and second, that once it has been properly tied to [Keynesian] income analysis it 
appears not only to be harmless, but really quite useful” (1957: 8). 
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Milton Friedman, was a libertarian advocate of free markets as well as a monetary economist; he 
framed his causal claims as a repudiation of the Keynesian settlement, in particular the Phillips 
curve (Friedman 1970).  Unlike the IMF’s staff economists, Friedman saw the quantity theory of 
money as fundamentally at odds with Keynesian causal claims.  Friedman’s 1967 presidential 
address to the American Economic Association (Friedman 1968) was a frontal attack on the 
Keynesian settlement.  Friedman claimed that monetary policy could not permanently increase 
employment, which contradicted the causal claims underpinning the program of “fine tuning.”  
Instead, Friedman argued that central banks should adopt a simple monetary “rule,” a fixed rate 
of growth of the money supply. 
Within the academic arena, an even more significant development was the rational expectations 
“revolution” (Begg 1982).  In the mid-1970s, Chicago economist Robert Lucas and his allies 
deployed then-novel mathematical techniques to provide explicit “microfoundations” for 
macroeconomic models, which they used to attack Keynesian causal claims, particularly those 
associated with the Phillips curve.  These sophisticated mathematical tools rapidly gained 
professional prestige and recruited adherents to the movement.  The rational expectations and 
monetarist “revolutions” were linked in the sense that both aimed to show that monetary policy 
was “neutral,” that is, had no “real effects” (it affected inflation but not growth or employment).  
Moreover, the rational expectations-derived analysis of policy “credibility” was designed to 
show that pre-commitment to a policy “rule” – such as Friedman’s monetary targets – would 
produce both higher growth and lower inflation.  Movement entrepreneurs advanced the category 
“new classical” as a professional identity to replace Keynesianism, successfully challenging the 
hitherto dominant professional identity.  By the end of the decade, Lucas had declared the 
demise of Keynesianism in the manifesto “After Keynesian Economics” (Lucas and Sargent 
1979).  As one Keynesian stalwart later put it, “by about 1980, it was hard to find an American 
academic macroeconomist under the age of 40 who professed to be a Keynesian” (Blinder 1988: 
278).  The revolutionaries substantially succeeded in imposing their criteria of professional 
judgment, making it difficult for younger scholars to publish papers with Keynesian causal 
claims (Rogoff 2002: 6).   
Within the US academy, the revolutionary gambit called forth a defensive reaction from 
Keynesian-identified incumbents, contributing to the polarization of professional identities and 
the appearance of incommensurable paradigms.  Many economists with strong Keynesian 
identities endorsed the terms of the classification struggle, accepting the classification of 
professional debates as a debate between incommensurably Keynesian and monetarist claims 
(Tobin 1981).  As some noted at the time, however, monetarist causal claims were logically 
compatible with the Keynesian framework (B. Friedman 1978), and as discussed below, 
subsequent developments show that there was no necessary link between rational expectations 
methodology and rejection of Keynesian causal claims.  Nevertheless, during the period of 
contentious polarization, monetarism, rational expectations, anti-Keynesian professional identity 
and free-market ideology became highly correlated.  Thus, Chicago economists were able to 
construct – for a time – a cohesive professional movement.   
In Latin America, a variant on this polarization process pitted “structuralists” (a professional 
identity associated with market intervention) against monetarists.  The long history of high 
inflation in the region led to intensifying polarization between monetarists and structuralists in 
the mid-1960s.  Structuralists classified the IMF’s “monetary approach” as “monetarist” (Babb 
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2007:142,144), thus misrecognizing the professional identity of the Fund’s self-described 
Keynesian staff economists.  Some politically engaged economists in the region went further, 
conflating “monetarism” with free-market ideology tout court (a classification aided by the fact 
that Milton Friedman was an advocate of both) (Cordero and Tello 1981: 82-86).  Thus, multiple 
dimensions of the field’s idea space – for example, positions on inflation and free markets – 
aligned, resulting in growing polarization.  
By the late 1970s, global economic and political developments created a window of opportunity 
for the revolutionary movement to achieve policy influence and cement its professional 
dominance in the academic arena.  In the US and UK, as is widely known, the advent of 
stagflation undermined the Phillips curve and the policy program associated with it, thus 
contributing to the initial successes of the monetarist and new classical professional movement 
(Blyth 2002; Hall 1990).  The movement formed alliances with conservative politicians and 
central bankers in the US and UK, where central banks adopted Friedman’s policy prescription 
for money supply targeting.  Professional divisions became highly correlated with the partisan 
conflicts associated with Reaganism and Thatcherism, contributing to polarization and the 
formation of antagonistic professional identities. 
In Latin America, economic and political changes – in particular rising inflation and the 
introduction of military regimes in the Southern Cone – also provided an opportunity for liberal 
US-trained economists (including the infamous “Chicago Boys”) to enhance their policy 
influence.  Although most histories of the impact of the “Chicago school” in Latin America focus 
on Friedman and his libertarian ideology (Dezalay and Garth 2002; Silva 2008; Valdés 1995), 
Friedman’s program for money-supply targeting had a relatively weak impact in the region; it 
was tried briefly in the Southern Cone countries, but quickly abandoned. 
However, there was a second and less widely known strand of Chicago monetary economics, 
known at the time as “global monetarism” (Whitman et al. 1975).  Starting in the late 1960s, a 
group of economists loosely grouped in the international macroeconomics workshop organized 
by Robert Mundell and Harry Johnson reworked the “monetary approach to the balance of 
payments” originally developed at the International Monetary Fund.  In contrast to the IMF staff, 
the global monetarists explicitly presented their model as a revolutionary break with 
Keynesianism (Polak 2001; Whitman et al. 1975).  However, the underlying causal claims had 
much in common, and as subsequent developments discussed below reveal, the actual degree of 
change was considerably less.  Mundell exemplifies the tension between continuity and change 
between pre- and post-1970s economics: his work of the late 60s continues to be seen as a 
seminal contribution to Keynesian international economics (Obstfeld 2003),12 but Mundell 
himself distanced himself from Keynesianism.  By the end of the 1970s he had declared that 
Keynes’ General Theory was “not relevant to modern economics” (Mundell 1971) and embraced 
a monetarist professional identity (Mundell 1983).   
Contrary to the view that Chicago economics constituted a coherent framework from which 
policy implications could be readily derived, Friedmanites and “global monetarists” were uneasy 
allies in the revolutionary professional movement.  Participants in the open economy workshop 
competed and sometimes conflicted with Friedman and his monetarist allies.  The professional 
                                                          
12 Marcus Fleming, who arrived independently at many of the same conclusions as Mundell, strongly identified as 
Keynesian (Mundell 2001). 
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identity of the international group was framed in terms of their “open economy” approach, which 
disputed many of Friedman’s causal assumptions.13  This competition was sometimes fierce: for 
example, Johnson (1971) argued that Friedman’s monetarism was “seriously inadequate as an 
approach to monetary theory” and predicted that his attempted “counter-revolution” would 
“peter out.”  However, in the revolutionary context of the 1970s, partisans of the open economy 
approach allied with the new classical revolutionaries on the basis of the methodological prestige 
of the rational expectations revolution, which attracted younger scholars seeking to make their 
careers.   
Despite the successful construction of this movement, the divergent causal claims of the two 
camps led to fundamentally different monetary policy programs.  While Friedman saw control 
over the money supply as a powerful tool for providing stability, global monetarists emphasized 
that international capital mobility undermined domestic monetary policy autonomy, meaning that 
countries could not reliably control their money supplies (Whitman et al. 1975).  If this was the 
case, small developing countries could hardly use money supply targeting à la Friedman to 
control inflation.  However, global monetarists had an alternative.  Early versions of the Chicago 
monetary approach to the balance of payments implied that that if a small country with high 
inflation fixed exchange rate a stable currency (such as the dollar), the rate of inflation in the 
smaller country should converge with that of the larger (e.g. Frenkel and Mussa 1980).  This 
policy program reflected the advocacy of some global monetarists, particularly Robert Mundell, 
for a return to fixed exchange rates after the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system (see 
Mundell 2000). 
In the Southern Cone countries (including Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) this policy program 
rapidly diffused in the form of fixed exchange rate-based stabilization plans known as 
“tablitas.”14  Fourcade Gourinchas and Babb (2002: 545) call this program “the Chicago model” 
although, as we have seen, this was the less well known of two competing models.  In each case, 
economists from Latin America who had learned about the Chicago monetary approach during 
their training in the US played a critical role in designing these stabilization plans.15  Thus, as in 
the monetarist experiments in the US and UK, the “revolutionary” monetary theories cultivated 
in Chicago achieved surprisingly rapid policy influence. 
In Argentina, the adoption of these ‘global monetarist’ policies in conjunction with trade opening 
and financial liberalization combined with the political shock of military rule to exacerbate the 
polarization between “structuralists” and “monetarists,” increasing the salience of antagonistic 
professional identities.  A younger generation of economists identified with structuralism 
criticized the Chicago-inspired stabilization policies adopted by the military regime, as well as 
the regime’s policy of financial deregulation.  Positions on monetary policy aligned with 
ideological divisions and broader political views on military rule, crystalizing diverse axes of 
debate into a single rift.  In the Latin American context, the salient classificatory schema often 
                                                          
13 As one alumnus puts it, “Mundell and Friedman ran very different schools.  For Friedman open economy was a 
very short topic: flexible exchange rates – fully flexible – and free trade.  What else was there to talk about?  For 
Mundell it was, rightly, hard to understand how Friedman could talk about monetary policy in a closed economy as 
if there were such a thing” (Dornbusch in Mundell and M. Friedman 2001: 22-3).   
14 This policy program was so called because of the tables of exchange rate values that accompanied them. 
15 For example, Argentine Central Bank President Adolfo Diz was a Chicago graduate of an earlier generation, while 
economist Ricardo Arriazu was closely involved in the design and evaluation of the stabilization plan. 
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pitted “heterodox” economists and policy-makers – structuralists and other critics of free market 
policies – against “orthodox” competitors who favored free markets.  While this division is 
sometimes analyzed in terms economists who received their training and professional 
socialization in the US versus those that trained locally, this distinction did not always hold in 
practice: for example, many members of the heterodox group in Argentina held economics 
Ph.D.s from the US. 
Rather, though these antagonistic identities were expressed in the terms of professional 
classification struggles, they were strongly correlated with “heteronomous” divisions related to 
the recent military regime.  As one “heterodox” economist (later a key adviser to the democratic 
government) put it: 
We aren’t orthodox in the…sense of Roque Fernández [a Chicago-educated central 
banker and finance minister]…and Chicago.  But here, the…divisions don’t have 
anything to do with the way that economics is done, eh?  We’re more Keynesian, more 
structuralist, it’s true, but that shouldn’t create a division.  The big division comes from 
the period of military rule.  Between economists who collaborated with the military and 
those of us that opposed the military.16   
Thus, for heterodox economists in Argentina, the correlation between their opposition to the 
military regime and their belief in heterodox principles formed the basis of a professional 
identity that set them apart from more “orthodox” competitors.   
However, this classificatory scheme is asymmetric: the competing “Chicago boys” 
unsurprisingly saw themselves not as primarily collaborators of a military regime but as neutral 
advisers.  Their professional identities blended pro-market ideology with the terms of the 
academic polarization of the 1970s, which some had joined as early contributors to the rational 
expectations “revolution.”  For example, Roque Fernández (the Chicago educated central banker 
just mentioned) himself saw his commitment to rational expectations as the key distinction 
between his own position in the field’s “idea space” and that of his competitors, who he broadly 
dismissed as “dirigiste” (i.e. not free market).17  This professional identity reflects the polarized 
professional classification struggles of Chicago in the 1970s, when rational expectations was 
closely tied to anti-Keynesianism and free market ideology.  Revealingly, he applied this blanket 
professional categorization not just to the “heterodox” structuralists, but also to competitors who 
are often considered “neoliberal” free market economists (such as Domingo Cavallo, an 
influential Argentine finance minister discussed below).  “Orthodox” and “heterodox” 
economists formed antagonistic identities but did not agree on what they disagreed about: their 
systems of professional classification were asymmetric.   
Whereas in Argentina the right dominated the left in the second half of the 1970s, the situation in 
Mexico was reversed.  In Mexico, “heterodox” economists scored major victories in the 1970s, 
limiting the influence of “orthodox” policymakers in the Bank of Mexico-Treasury establishment 
(including the Mexican “Chicago boys”).  Aided by the availability of international credit, 
advocates of state-led development scored policy victories after 1970, resulting in a significant 
expansion of state spending and inflation.  Rising inflation led to infighting within the semi-
                                                          
16 Anonymous interview 
17 Roque Fernandez oral history interview 
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authoritarian regime as “orthodox” factions advocated stabilization measures like those 
advocated by the IMF (c.f. Babb 2001).  Internal conflicts came to a head with the outbreak of 
the debt crisis in the early 1980s; “orthodox” fiscal conservatives called for austerity while 
heterodox officials successfully called for nationalization of the banking system and imposition 
of direct controls to stop capital flight. 
As in Argentina, the emergence of competing factions reflected the polarization of professional 
identities.  On the one hand, “heterodox” policymakers such as Carlos Tello (a Cambridge-
educated economist and Treasury Secretary in the 1970s) saw the conflict as an epic battle 
between economic nationalists and their neoliberal opponents, whose ideas he associated with 
Friedman’s monetarism (Cordero and Tello 1981: 82-86).    However, Tello’s classification of 
his opponents as “monetarists” is a classic act of misrecognition.  For example, Treasury 
Secretary Jesús Silva Herzog – Tello’s rival and one of the alleged monetarists – himself 
identified as “heterodox.”  As he put it, “I’m not so [orthodox].  As Secretary of the Treasury, 
given the pressure of events, I had to take an orthodox stance.  But in my philosophy I’m 
heterodox.”18  Silva Herzog’s position in the field’s idea space blended interventionist credit 
policies to promote economic development19 with budget-balancing fiscal conservatism, a 
mixture which placed him somewhere in the ambiguous center, particularly vulnerable to 
misrecognition.  From this standpoint, it was not the causal claims themselves that induced 
polarization in the 1970s, but rather the competition over economic policymaking that produced 
polarized professional identities. 
In sum, during the contentious 1970s, economists who identified with monetarism and rational 
expectations succeeded in building professional movements within academic economics that 
rapidly diffused into the policy arena.  As a result of the initially successful strategies of these 
“revolutionary” movements, multiple dimensions of the field’s idea space crystalized into single, 
overarching rupture reflected in polarizing identities.  The high correlation between intrinsically 
unrelated dimensions (such as that of rational expectations methodology with free market 
ideology) gave this episode of contention the appearance of fundamental “paradigmatic” schism.  
The professional polarization emerging from the academic arena was refracted through local 
conflicts in Latin American macroeconomic policy fields in different ways.  In Argentina, 
Chicago economics had a rapid and profound impact through the spread of novel policy 
programs.  Military rule intensified a process of polarization in which professional identities 
became increasingly antagonistic.  In contrast, in Mexico, the “Chicago school” as such had a 
limited impact. Nevertheless, the left saw the right as emissaries of Chicago and the IMF, while 
the right saw the left as irresponsible populists; both sides misrecognized the beliefs of their 
competitors.  In both cases, the appearance of competing paradigms had more to do with the 
alignment of multiple dimensions of the field’s “idea space” and professional identities, than 
underlying causal claims. 
The emergence of centripetal forces: heterodox stabilization 
Despite initial success, in the early 1980s the “revolutionary” innovations of Chicago economics 
ran aground on the practical difficulties of policy implementation.  This was the case both with 
the US Federal Reserve’s monetarist experiment (Krippner 2011) and in Southern Cone 
                                                          
18 Silva Herzog interview 
19 See Silva Herzog Flores (2009).  
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countries, where the “tablita” policy program collapsed spectacularly (Barletta, Blejer, and 
Landau 1983).  Coinciding with these difficulties of implementation, political trends changed the 
context of policy competition.  The collapse of the military regimes in Argentina created an 
opportunity for a younger generation of heterodox policymakers to assume policy-making power 
under the new democratic government after 1983.  In Mexico, the victory of the “heterodox” 
faction in nationalizing the financial system proved to be pyrrhic: only months later, this faction 
was purged from the regime under a new president, who switched to the more orthodox policies 
favored by the Bank of Mexico-Treasury establishment.  In both countries, these political 
developments facilitated the beginnings of a gradual “return to the center.”   
In Argentina, the return to the center was slow, as the deep division left by the military regime 
continued to fuel factionalism and contention.  Nevertheless, heterodox economists were 
undergoing reconciliation with traditional IMF-type policies, which the previous generation of 
structuralists had denounced as “monetarism.”  While the earlier structuralists had advocated a 
gradualist approach to inflation stabilization, ever-higher inflation compelled an adjustment of 
priorities in the early 1980s.  But designing a heterodox stabilization program to address inflation 
in the near term required a substantial re-thinking of the structuralist tradition.  The response was 
a hybrid policy program that combined “orthodox” fiscal and monetary policies with 
“heterodox” elements, such as wage and price controls.  Heterodox plans were adopted in the 
mid-1980s in Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Mexico, meeting with varying degrees of success.  In 
Argentina, economists who played a direct role in designing and implementing these policies as 
finance ministers, central bankers and advisers now became classified as “neo-structuralists.”20  
Unlike the (global) monetarist experiments of the 1970s, the heterodox policy program did not 
diffuse from the academic arena in the US towards Latin America; rather, it was a hybrid form 
that reflected the causal debates in the profession but was motivated by urgent policy demands.   
Relative to the polarized debates of the 1970s, the heterodox policy program represented a return 
to the center in terms of causal claims and policy prescriptions, if not yet professional identities.  
On the one hand, the heterodox plans represented an evolution in the monetarist direction in the 
dual sense that they adopted the monetarists’ traditional policy goal (low inflation) and the IMF’s 
traditional policy prescription for monetary and fiscal restraint.  On the other hand, the neo-
structuralists rejected the core monetarist claim based on the quantity theory of money; instead, 
they claimed that inflation had an important inertial component (essentially, that the economy 
became habituated to rapidly rising prices).21  As one Chicago graduate put it:  
Friedman argues that inflation, always and everywhere, is a monetary phenomenon—too 
much money chasing too few goods, burning holes in peoples’ pockets…[The neo-
structuralist view] defends a very different view of the inflation process…Inflation is the 
result of inertia…That is decidedly not the theory espoused by ‘Chicago boys’ brought 
up on the quantity of money and on perfect competition (Dornbusch in Bresser Pereira 
and Nakano 1987: vii). 
                                                          
20 This group included finance minister Juan Sourouille, Central Bank President José Luis Machinea, and other 
economists associated with the Institute for the Development of State and Society (IDES). 
21 This was also a direct rejection of rational expectations, because it implied that inflation expectations were 
backward-looking (adaptive) rather than forward-looking (rational). 
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Moreover, the heterodox policy program involved comprehensive wage and price controls or 
agreements, implying a fundamental intervention into the price mechanism at the core of 
markets.  Thus, while the neo-structuralists incorporated “orthodox” policies of fiscal and 
monetary discipline into their policy program, this fact should not lead one to the conclusion that 
they had simply capitulated to monetarist reasoning.  Rather, the heterodox policy program was a 
synthesis of “orthodox” and “heterodox” programs.   
A surprising indicator of the centripetal forces at work is that fact that the heterodox program 
received unexpected support from influential alumni of the Chicago open economy workshop.  
In particular, Stanley Fischer and Rudiger Dornbusch – respectively a young assistant professor 
and graduate student at Chicago during the revolutionary mid-1970s – became key international 
supporters of the heterodox experiments.  Dornbusch and Fischer were participants in the open 
economy macro circles that went under the name “global monetarism” in the 1970s, and both 
were early recruits to the rational expectations “revolution.”  Yet these “Chicago boys” did not 
shy away from supporting  the heterodox, market-intervening aspects of the plans: for example, 
Dornbusch wrote that he had “little doubt that the concept of these new programs is entirely 
correct – a longstanding distain for controls in the economics profession notwithstanding” 
(Dornbusch and Simonsen 1987: 2).  Similarly, while some scholars have interpreted Fischer’s 
Chicago connection to imply that he was a “firm monetarist” (Maman and Rosenhek 2007: 265), 
Fischer in fact argued that wage and price controls played a critical role in stabilization (Fischer 
2004: 391; c.f. Fischer 1987).  The anomaly is worth underscoring: the Chicago economics 
professor (and future senior IMF official) firmly supported wage and price controls as a policy 
program (if supported by fiscal restraint).  This was hardly the position of a “firm monetarist” or 
an inflexible adherent to free markets. 
The policy positions taken by economists like Dornbusch and Fischer reflect centripetal forces 
emerging within both academic and policy arenas of the macroeconomics field.  At Chicago, 
both Dornbusch and Fischer had made their academic careers using the sophisticated 
mathematics of the rational expectations “revolution,” originally presented as a repudiation of 
Keynesianism.  However, they did so in ways that synthesized Keynesian insights with rational 
expectations “microfoundations,” in work that would later be regarded as seminal in the 
development of the New Keynesian economics.  This reflects the high professional returns to 
academic work that synthesizes what appear to be incommensurable paradigms.   
The return to the center also reflected the difficulties of applying academic models to actual 
policymaking.  As a participant in the development of “global monetarism,” Dornbusch had 
watched the Southern Cone exchange rate experiments closely, reaching the conclusion that they 
had been “catastrophic” (Dornbusch 1982: 701-4).  Like the neo-structuralists, he concluded that 
the programs failed in part because they failed to address inflationary inertia.  Direct 
participation in policy-making as officials and advisers strengthened these centripetal forces.  
Ironically, Dornbusch visited Argentina and Brazil and advised the neo-structuralists to adopt a 
looser monetary policy, in an ironic role reversal.22  Similarly, in 1988 Fischer became chief 
economist at the World Bank where he directed a group that studied the failure of orthodox 
policies in Latin America and the promise of the heterodox alternative (Kiguel and Liviatan 
1988).  Engagement with policy-making reduced commitment to the professional movement 
                                                          
22 Juan Sourouille interview, Oral History Archives, Instituto Gino Germani 
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spearheaded by the early rational expectations revolutionaries.  As Dornbusch put it, his policy 
interests led him to recognize “the near-complete sterility of the [new classical] approach in the 
face of actual policy issues” (Dornbusch 1988: ix-x).23   
As these centripetal forces took hold, the correlation between methodological, policy, and 
ideological dimensions of professional competition weakened.  This incipient return to the center 
of the 1980s was reflected in the ambiguous professional identities of economists like Dornbusch 
and Fischer.  Like many synthesizers located somewhere in the center of a professional field, 
Fischer tended to eschew labels altogether, arguing that policy-oriented economics was not “a 
field divided among schools, Keynesians, monetarists, new classical, [and] New Keynesian” but 
rather unified by “basic models” (Fischer and Blanchard 1989: xi).  Nevertheless, asked about 
his views on Keynes and Friedman, Fischer responded:  
The Keynesian apparatus is really enormously important, and…if students could read 
only one thing…I would still teach them Keynesianism…I think the specifics of Milton 
Friedman's macroeconomics, monetarism, etc., have not stood up. We do monetary 
policy now much more like Keynesians thought of it than [how] Milton Friedman 
thought we should be doing it (Fischer 2001b). 
Similarly, despite having made his career by incorporating rational expectations methodology 
into the open economy approach, Dornbusch’s views reflected increasing skepticism towards 
what he called “oversimplified versions of a rational expectations economy” (Dornbusch and 
Simonsen 1987: 7).  For Dornbusch, Fischer and many like-minded economists and 
policymakers, their “open economy” pedigree was more important than monetarism or rational 
expectations; this orthogonal division assumed importance relative to other markers, further 
reducing the correlation among axes of debate and thus polarization.   
Rather than the ideologically motivated and anti-Keynesian revolutionaries of the Chicago 
school, it was a diffuse network originating in the open economy workshop that achieved the 
most influence in the policy-making arena beginning in the 1980s.  Several alumni of the open 
economy workshop took jobs at the IMF and moderated their revolutionary posture in this more 
bureaucratic context, beginning to emphasize consistency of the Chicago “monetary approach” 
with the older version developed at the Fund.24  Meanwhile, Dornbusch and Fischer moved to 
MIT, where they trained a surprising number of the future leaders of international organizations, 
central banks, and finance ministries, including US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, 
European Central Bank President Mario Draghi, US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, and 
IMF Chief Economists Kenneth Rogoff and Oliver Blanchard, among many others.  As this 
second generation moved into the policy arena, their allegiance to the anti-Keynesian 
professional movement faded, and antagonistic professional identities declined in salience. 
Whether heterodox innovations generated polarization on the ground in Latin America depended 
on the alignment of policy debates with broader political conflicts.  As noted above, in Argentina 
                                                          
23 The text in brackets refers to the “intertemporal approach” in the original; in the jargon, this is a reference to the 
new classical economics. 
24 For example, Jacob Frenkel and Michael Mussa (Chicago open economy alumni who successively served as IMF 
Research Director during the 1980s and 90s) conceded, “[the] theoretical models applied to balance of payments 
analysis in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s [in Chicago] incorporate the same basic elements as earlier such models 
and, correspondingly, share many of the same properties and implications” (Frenkel and Mussa 1984: 3). 
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the stark divide between heterodox structuralists and orthodox liberals was derived less from any 
basic paradigmatic difference than the crystallization of professional divisions with broader 
political conflicts rooted in the country’s recent history of military rule.  On the one hand, the 
neo-structuralist economists who designed the “heterodox” stabilization policy were willing to 
adopt the mantel of “orthodoxy:” for example, finance minister Juan Sourouille argued that the 
plan was “a good example of orthodoxy.”25  On the other hand, Argentine “Chicago boys” (such 
as Roque Fernández, discussed above) derided the neo-structuralists as mere “populists” with no 
concern for inflation and denounced heterodox policies as old wine in new bottles (Fernández 
1990).  The views of local Chicago alumni in Argentina contrast sharply with that of their former 
classmates and professors: Fernández and Dornbusch were both Chicago graduates, but they 
took fundamentally different positions.  The difference was that the former was embedded in 
local political struggles while the latter was not.  Rather than a paradigmatic divide, the deep 
polarization among Argentine elites reflected the persistence of antagonistic identities rooted in 
the recent history of military rule.  
In contrast, in Mexico, although a heterodox stabilization plan was adopted in 1987, it was not 
the object of sharp conflict in the macroeconomic policy field.  Following the purge of the 
nationalist faction in 1982, policy came back under the sway of economists associated with the 
Bank of Mexico-Treasury establishment.  The heterodox plan was designed and overseen by 
Treasury Secretary Pedro Aspe (a Dornbusch student), who criticized conventional approaches to 
stabilization in terms similar to those of the Argentine neo-structuralists.  Aspe criticized the 
“neoclassical theory of inflation” which held that “inflation is essentially a monetary 
phenomenon” (a reference to Friedman’s monetarism) (Aspe 1993: 8).  But while similar causal 
claims and professional classification struggles were associated with polarization between 
“heterodox” and “orthodox” economists in Argentina, professional polarization declined in 
Mexico.  In contrast to the Argentine “Chicago boys,” Chicago alumni in the Bank of Mexico 
supported the heterodox pact in Mexico.26  Thus, despite occupying a position in the field’s 
“idea space” similar to the neo-structuralists, in the Mexican context Aspe was able to maintain 
an alliance with Chicago-educated monetarists similar to Roque Fernández in Argentina.  Similar 
differences in “idea space” took on a different meaning in “social space.”   
In sum, the 1980s was a period of surprising re-convergence in the macroeconomic policy field 
following the “revolutionary” contention of the 1970s.  Heterodox stabilization plans were the 
outgrowth of a partial rapprochement of the younger generation of neo-structuralists with the 
orthodox policies prescribed by the IMF.  At the same time, however, economists linked to the 
open economy network that emerged from Chicago unexpectedly supported these heterodox 
innovations.  This support reflected the centripetal forces that began to emerge after the years of 
revolutionary fervor.  On the ground in Latin America, the extent to which polarization persisted 
in the midst of a transnational return to the center depended on local conflicts: in Argentina, the 
crystallization of professional debates with the broader struggle over democracy exacerbated 
divisions in the field, while in Mexico the defeat of the more radical heterodox faction unified a 
heterogeneous group of elite technocrats in the Mexican state. 
                                                          
25 Interview, Juan Sourrouille 
26 For example, influential central bank official Francisco Gil Díaz; interviews with former Mexican officials. 
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Fragile settlement: the bipolar view 
Despite initial success in lowering inflation, the heterodox program ultimately failed in 
Argentina, giving way to hyperinflation at the end of the 1980s.  In contrast, the heterodox 
program was deemed a success in Mexico but gradually changed in meaning.  In Argentina, the 
policy program which ultimately put an end to decades of high inflation was a variant of the 
fixed exchange rate policy program advocated by Robert Mundell and other “global monetarists” 
in the 1970s.  These policies were now repackaged as “exchange rate-based stabilization” (c.f. 
Woodruff 2005), avoiding the classification struggles of the 1970s, but the policy program and 
underlying causal claims shared much in common.  The Argentine policy program was a variant 
known as a “hard peg:” a legally binding institutional commitment to a fixed exchange rate, in 
this case a one-to-one parity with the dollar.  The hard peg program was part of a global wave of 
policy experiments which included the creation of the Euro (for which Mundell was sometimes 
given intellectual credit) and the outright adoption of the dollar in some Latin American 
countries.27  This policy program was largely specific to developing countries and the 
interconnected economies of continental Europe; as a result, the emergent settlement initially 
took a different form in these regions than in the US academic arena (to which I return in the 
next section).  The initial success of these policies in ending decades of high inflation brought 
the macroeconomic policy field closer towards settlement– though this incipient settlement 
proved fragile.   
In its new incarnation, the exchange rate based stabilization policy program – and especially the 
hard peg variant – was not an academic innovation, but rather a hybrid form that originated in an 
often ad hoc manner in particular countries but drew support from causal claims originating in 
the academic arena.  Similarly, while the IMF began to conditionally support exchange rate-
based stabilization during the 1990s (particularly under the leadership of Stanley Fischer), the 
Fund followed, rather than led, the rise of this policy program (Cavallo and Cottani 1997).  
Nevertheless, as we will see, the causal claims underpinning exchange rate-based stabilization 
were drawn from global monetarism and the rational expectations revolution, while synthesizing 
these claims with the heterodox experience of the 1980s. 
Again, settlement does not imply the absence of professional contention: in fact, both academic 
and policy arenas were the scene of a vigorous debate over monetary policies in developing 
countries, particularly whether they should “float” their currencies or “fix” them to the dollar, as 
the exchange rate based stabilization program recommended.  The “float or fix” debate reflected 
a longstanding division on the exchange rate issue between global monetarists and their “closed 
economy” competitors, captured in the policy programs of Mundell and Friedman (see Mundell 
and Friedman 2001).  But these persistent debates became increasingly disconnected from 
professional identity and the state/market dimension; among free market advocates, there were 
supporters of both policy programs, and conversely, both ideologically pure libertarians and 
pragmatic market reformers could embrace the fixed exchange rate policy program.  Moreover, 
because exchange rate based stabilization was often followed by an economic boom, at least 
initially (Woodruff 2005), the program dodged the debate over the inflation-employment tradeoff 
(the Phillips curve), facilitating the emergence of settlement. 
                                                          
27Macroeconomists see the creation of a monetary union (such as the Euro) or the adoption of the dollar by another 
country as simply the extreme form of a permanently fixed exchange rate. 
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Advocates of the fixed exchange rate program also advanced competing causal claims and 
ideological rationales for the same policy. For example, one argument for “hard pegs” was that 
these policies would “tie the hands of the state,” enforcing monetary and fiscal austerity; this 
argument was presented by ideological libertarians, such as the Cato Institute economists who 
advocated dollarization and other “hard pegs” around the world (Hanke and Schuler 1999).  
Similarly, from one standpoint, the causal claims underpinning the exchange rate-based 
stabilization policy program represented a return to “global monetarism” (i.e. the emphasis on 
the link between the exchange rate and inflation) and the new classical claim that binding policy 
rules generated “credibility” and therefore superior outcomes.  However, from a different 
standpoint, the causal claims in support of the policy program reflected a synthesis of the 
experience of heterodox plans of the 1980s with the causal claims of global monetarists (as the 
Argentine and Mexican cases illustrate below).  The ease with which Dornbusch and Fischer 
transitioned from supporting heterodox plans to supporting hard pegs (Dornbusch 2001; Fischer 
2001a) is another indication of this.   
One attempt to institutionalize this settlement was the “bipolar view” associated with Stanley 
Fischer, now the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF.  This compromise view stated that 
both “hard pegs” and fully flexible currencies were viable policy options (Fischer 2001a).  In the 
latter case, countries were advised to commit to the “inflation targeting” policy program 
discussed in the following section.  However, the bipolar view ruled out so-called “intermediate” 
regimes: fixed exchange rates without binding institutional commitments (a category which 
included most developing countries at the time).28  The bipolar view aimed to stabilize debates, 
not just between “Keynesian” and “monetarist” positions (as those had been understood during 
the 1970s), but among members of the diffuse open economy network, which included 
supporters of both fixed and floating exchange rates.   
The emergence of settlement is reflected in the cross-cutting dimensions the field’s idea space, a 
movement towards the center, and consequent misrecognition of the position of key actors in the 
field’s idea space.  A key example is Domingo Cavallo, a Harvard-trained economist and the 
finance minister who implemented key neoliberal reforms during the 1990s and introduced the 
“hard peg” policy program plan in Argentina.  Cavallo had held a position under the military 
regime in the early 1980s, which made him persona non grata among the neo-structuralists.  But 
while Cavallo has often been labelled a “neoliberal” (e.g. Teichman 1997), he was hardly seen as 
“one of their own” by the local branch of the Chicago school either: he was suspected of 
harboring “dirigiste” instincts by Chicago-educated central banker Roque Fernández.29  As 
Cavallo himself put it, “I was seen as someone who had a heterodox solution, based more on 
intervention by the government and the central bank” (Cavallo and de Pablo 2001: 111).  These 
classification struggles reflect Cavallo’s position in the center of the field, particularly on the 
ideological dimension: Cavallo was a market reformer, to be sure, but more pragmatic (or less 
ideologically pure) than the Chicago group.  As a result, he was misrecognized both by the neo-
structuralists (and many external observers) on his “left” and the libertarians on his “right.” 
These classification struggles also reflect competing causal claims and policy programs in the 
monetary arena.  When initially proposed, Cavallo’s hard peg program was seen as “heterodox” 
                                                          
28 Author’s calculations from data compiled by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
29 Interview, Roque Fernández 
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by competitors widely classified as “orthodox” in the Argentine context.30  Moreover, Cavallo’s 
causal claims about the hard peg program were closer to the neo-structuralists than to the 
Chicago boys.31  Meanwhile, the local “Chicago boys” were split: while Fernández regarded the 
hard peg policy program (and Cavallo himself) with suspicion, some of his close allies had 
proposed the program independently (Almansi and Rodriguez 1997).  While Cavallo himself 
presented the program as a refutation of Friedman-style monetarism (Cavallo 1999), the Chicago 
school supporters of the program invoked causal claims derived from “global monetarism” in 
support of the same policy.  The existence of competing causal claims in support of the same 
policy, and conversely, support for different policies among economists who otherwise shared 
professional identities and ideological leanings (such as Fernández and his colleagues) is 
indicative of declining correlation between different dimensions and emerging settlement. 
Despite the initial contention surrounding the policy program, its dramatic success paved the way 
for the emergence of a local settlement during the 1990s.  Actors who were initially skeptical 
about the policy program – such as Central Bank President Roque Fernández – became firm 
supporters following its success.  Neo-structuralists who had opposed the program at first 
gradually became reconciled to its continuity; thus, when José Luis Machinea – a member of the 
heterodox “neo-structuralist” faction in the 1980s as President of the Central Bank – was 
appointed Economy Minister in the late 1990s, he committed to continue with the system.  A 
fragile settlement emerged in Argentina and the division between “heterodox” and “orthodox” 
economists lost salience.   
In Mexico, the successful heterodox plan was gradually re-interpreted within the logic of 
exchange rate-based stabilization.  The Mexican finance ministry – still under the leadership of 
Pedro Aspe – and Bank of Mexico put increasing rhetorical weight on the role of the exchange 
rate, turning a policy initially labelled “heterodox” (because of its reliance on interventionist 
price agreements) into one widely accepted as “orthodox,” without altering the content of the 
policy itself.  The Mexican case underscores the continuity between the heterodox plans of the 
1980s and the exchange rate based stabilization program; in this case, they were one and the 
same. 
Again however, settlement does not imply a lack of contention, only that debates are normalized, 
rather than crystalizing into overarching rifts.  One indicator of this is that the sharpest debate 
over the Mexican stabilization plan occurred between Mexican Finance Minister Pedro Aspe and 
his former adviser, Rudiger Dornbusch.  Though Dornbusch was a supporter of both heterodox 
and exchange rate-based stabilization, over time he became critical of the stabilization plan 
overseen by his former student (Dornbusch and Werner 1994).  In response, Aspe publicly 
denounced his former mentor as “a dangerous man.”  Unlike the battles of the 1970s, this dispute 
– however acrimonious – did not occur between economists with competing professional 
identities.  Rather, it broke out between an academic and his former student, whose underlying 
                                                          
30 These competitors included Orlando Ferreres and Javier Gonzalez Fraga, senior officials in the finance ministry 
and central bank in 1989, when Cavallo’s proposal was first introduced (source: author’s interviews). 
31 To simplify, there were two main interpretations of the hyperinflation crisis in Argentina: the neo-structuralists 
argued that the crisis was caused by a run on the currency, whereas the local Chicago group advanced a modified 
monetarist interpretation; in arguing that the hard peg ended the crisis by stopping the run on the currency (Cavallo 
and Cavallo 1996), Cavallo was closer to the former.  Fernández dismissed this as a “heterodox” interpretation 
(source: author’s interview). 
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views were quite similar.  This reflects the lack of correlation between policy debates and 
professional identities and ideology, and a normalization of conflict during a period of emerging 
settlement. 
In summary, during the 1990s, an incipient settlement emerged in the policy arenas of the 
transnational macroeconomics field.  This settlement emerged as policy successes defused 
longstanding criticisms, such as the traditional complaint that stabilization caused recession.  At 
the same time, opinion leaders in the field, such as Stanley Fischer, made concerted efforts to 
institutionalize a compromise policy program on which economists and policymakers with 
diverse ideological commitment and causal views could agree.  Settlement did not imply the 
absence of conflict: indeed, policy debates raged throughout the decade, and conjunctural 
disagreements were sometimes sharp, as the Aspe-Dornbusch spat shows.  What was different 
compared to the 1970s was that these debates no longer pitted factions with competing 
professional identities and apparent commitment to different paradigms. 
However, this incipient settlement was undermined by the reality of implementation.  Currency 
crises in Mexico in 1994 and Argentina in 2001 put an end to the experiments in exchange rate-
based stabilization and struck a major blow to the bipolar view.  Yet the crisis of exchange rate 
based stabilization did not result in a renewal of professional polarization; rather, it gave way to 
the New Keynesian settlement which had already gained predominance within the academic 
arena. 
Consolidation of settlement: New Keynesianism and inflation targeting 
Returning to the academic arena, by the beginning of the 1990s professional polarization had 
faded and a new settlement had emerged.  Debates over monetary policy and inflation no longer 
pitted “monetarists” against “Keynesians” and these polarizing professional identities gradually 
declined in salience.  Economists and central bankers proudly proclaimed that “the world had 
achieved a working consensus on the core principles of monetary policy by the late 1990s,” 
overcoming the “theoretical disarray” of the 1970s (Goodfriend 2007: 48).  In 2004, Ben 
Bernanke (then Governor of the US Federal Reserve) proclaimed the onset of a “great 
moderation,” which he attributed to the perfection of monetary policy by the Fed and other 
central banks.  In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-9, this vision now appears deeply 
complacent, but it speaks to the sense of confident settlement that prevailed at the time.   
Within academic and central banking circles, the policy program associated with this settlement 
was inflation targeting, under which central banks commit to quantitative targets for a low rate of 
inflation (generally around 3%) as the primary goal of monetary policy.  By the mid-2000s, 
inflation targeting had been adopted by 25 countries, including Mexico, Chile, Brazil and several 
other Latin American countries.  While the United States did not commit to explicit inflation 
targets, it tacitly adhered to a closely related policy program, the “Taylor rule.”32  Like the 
heterodox and exchange rate-based stabilization programs, inflation targeting was not an 
academic innovation that diffused to the policy-making arena, but rather a hybrid form that 
emerged in central banks but gained legitimacy from the causal claims generated by academics.  
                                                          
32 To simplify, the Taylor rule prescribes a monetary policy target (the interest rate) as a function of the output gap 
(the difference between actual and potential GDP), the rate of inflation, and the target rate of inflation. 
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Nor did international organizations like the IMF lead the shift towards inflation targeting in 
developing countries, though IMF support after 2000 helped consolidate the shift.33 
As noted above, several authors have argued that inflating targeting is a corollary of the 
“neoliberal paradigm” insofar as it entails, according to these authors, an exclusive commitment 
to low inflation as a policy goal and a disregard for growth and employment (Kirshner 1999; 
Maman and Rosenhek 2009).  The goal of this paper is not to defend inflation targeting against 
its critics, but rather to analyze the transformation of the field of macroeconomic policy-making 
in order to understand its influence.  From this standpoint, the paradigm shift view oversimplifies 
the dynamics of change within the transnational macroeconomic field.  Specifically, this view 
both exaggerates the change in policy goals (“third order change,” in Hall’s conception of 
paradigm shifts) and the heterogeneity of these goals within settlements.  Just as the Keynesian 
settlement accommodated both the fine tuning policy program and the orthodox program of the 
IMF, the New Keynesian settlement accommodates multiple policy goals and causal claims in 
support of these goals. 
Understanding the rise of the New Keynesian economics and its connection to inflation targeting, 
requires taking a step back to the revolutionary contention of the 1970s.  To recapitulate, a 
central point of contention in Friedman’s assault on Keynesianism was the Phillips curve concept 
of a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment.  As previous authors have emphasized (Blyth 
2002; Hall 1990), during the 1970s, the monetarist and rational expectations attacks on the 
Keynesian settlement, combined with the breakdown of the empirical relationship between 
inflation and unemployment, undermined the causal claims associated with the Phillips curve.  
However, story does not end here.  Almost immediately, economists began the professionally 
rewarding work of synthesizing rational expectations methodology with Keynesian insights 
(Mankiw 1990).  Economists who later went on to become influential policymakers in the US 
and international organizations, including Stanley Fischer, John Taylor, and Guillermo Calvo, 
played a major role in this synthesis.  By the 1980s, rational expectations-based models of 
“frictions” (slowly adjusting wages and prices) that motivated Keynesian causal claims were 
well developed.  These models restored a theoretical argument for a short-run Phillips curve 
tradeoff between inflation and growth (Gordon 2011: 24-5).   
These theoretical developments paralleled practical developments in monetary policy-making.  
Ironically, the monetarist experiment implemented by the Federal Reserve under Volcker 
provided dramatic evidence that sharp disinflation did indeed have contractionary effects on 
growth and employment, contrary the predictions of the monetarist and new classical 
revolutionaries (Fischer 2004: 176; C. Romer and D. Romer 1989).  Practical policy 
implementation contributed to centripetal forces by showing reality to be far messier than 
implied by the causal claims of the revolutionaries. 
By the 1990s, the center of gravity in the inflation-unemployment debate had shifted back in the 
Keynesian direction in policymaking circles in the US.  As one author put it, “the debate over 
whether monetary policy is ‘neutral’ with respect to real economic outcomes [i.e. growth and 
employment] seems largely an episode from the discipline’s past” (B. Friedman 2008: 3; c.f. 
Bernanke and Mishkin 1997; Fischer 2004).  This New Keynesian settlement cut across political 
                                                          
33 According to documents obtained from the IMF archives, only after about 1999 did the IMF begin to actively 
encourage countries to adopt inflation targets, by which time many countries already had. 
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lines, reducing the correlation between professional and political divisions and thus polarization: 
Democratic former Federal Reserve Vice-Governor Alan Blinder (1997) calls the Phillips curve 
the “clean little secret” of macroeconomics, while Greg Mankiw (chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers during the George W. Bush administration) refers to the “inexorable and 
mysterious tradeoff between inflation and unemployment” (Mankiw 2001).  Widespread 
acceptance of the casual effects of monetary policy on growth shifted debates from whether there 
was a tradeoff to whether this tradeoff could be reduced by central bank “credibility,” a concept 
central to the rational expectations revolution.  This settlement synthesized the Keynesian 
concept of a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment with the rational expectations-derived 
emphasis on credibility, while abandoning the monetarist prescription for simple policy “rules.” 
In the academic arena, the causal claims that supported inflation targeting grew out of this New 
Keynesian resurgence, exemplified by US Federal Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke (whose MIT 
Ph.D. supervisor was Stanley Fischer).  Examining Bernanke’s case for inflation targeting 
undermines the claim that the rise of inflation targeting represents a fundamental “paradigm 
shift” from a growth-centric Keynesian worldview to an inflation-centric monetarist paradigm 
(Kirshner 1999; Maman and Rosenhek 2009).  Bernanke emphasized that under inflation 
targeting, price stability is the “primary” objective of policy “in the medium- to-long-term” but 
that “inflation targeting central banks always make room for short-run stabilization objectives” 
(Bernanke and Mishkin 1997: 101).  He explicitly rejected the causal claims of the revolutionary 
movement of the 1970s, noting that “some economists of new classical or monetarist persuasions 
might claim that inflation should be the sole concern of monetary policy in the short run as well, 
arguing that using monetary policy for short-run stabilization of the real economy is undesirable, 
infeasible, or both” (ibid: 100).  To such critics, he reiterated that “the idea that monetary policy 
has (essentially) no legitimate goals besides inflation would find little support among central 
bankers, the public and most monetary economists” (ibid: 105).  These causal claims were more 
than academic rhetoric, but reflect the Federal Reserve’s policy program: under Greenspan, the 
Fed delivered on these claim by keeping interest rates low during the late 1990s and early 
2000s.34 
This is not to claim that the revolutionary movement achieved no victories.  For example, one of 
the key claims of Friedman’s professional movement was that monetary policy was a more 
powerful tool of economic stabilization than the fiscal policy favored by Keynesians in the 
1960s.  This claim has largely been incorporated into the New Keynesian settlement.  Similarly, 
the concept of policy credibility, which was central to the rational expectations revolution, forms 
part of the inflation targeting policy program.  Central bankers may place more emphasis on 
inflation than in the 1960s, but Bernanke’s causal claims – and the Fed’s behavior – suggest that 
this shift stops short of a fundamental change in policy goals.  In this sense, the revolutionary 
movements shifted the center of gravity in their preferred direction, though not nearly to the 
extent hoped by Friedman and Lucas in the 1970s.   
                                                          
34 This is not the place for a full discussion, but whatever the Fed’s other failings – and the financial crisis indicates 
that there were many – during the Greenspan era (1987-2006), the Fed delivered both low unemployment and low 
inflation.  The Fed did not raise interest rates as substantially as advocated by many inflation “hawks” during the 
late 1990s, and kept interest rates low after the recession of the early 2000s.  In this sense there is substantial 
evidence that “the Federal Reserve has taken its dual mandate [to purse both full employment and price stability] 
very seriously during the Greenspan years” (Blinder and Reis 2005: 29). 
27 
 
Moreover, the causal claims of the revolutionaries thrive in some corners of the settlement, 
because settlements accommodate multiple causal claims in support of the same policy program. 
Thus, in Latin America, many central banks echo the claims of monetary neutrality associated 
with the revolutionary movement.  This is the case, for example, in Mexico, which adopted the 
inflation targeting policy program following the currency crisis of 1994.  The Bank of Mexico 
has institutionalized causal claims that maintain that there is no tradeoff between inflation and 
growth (even in the short run) in Mexico, and that monetary policy must exclusively attend to 
inflation (e.g. Banco de México 1996).35  This rhetoric directly contradicts Bernanke’s just-cited 
claim that there is little support for the claim that “monetary policy has…no legitimate goal 
besides inflation.”  In this sense, the Bank of Mexico has indeed embraced the causal claims of 
the monetarist and rational expectations revolutionaries.  Yet while these different causal claims 
generated polarizing professional identities and competing policy programs in the 1970s, central 
bankers advancing very different causal claims now claim to adhere to the same global 
“consensus” in favor of inflation targeting.  Moreover, in the Mexican case, these claims reflect 
continuity between the orthodox monetary policies favored by the Bank of Mexico-Treasury 
establishment in the 1950s and 60s, rather than a change of policy goals. 
In Argentina, policy debates have also been dominated by a return to causal claims associated 
with the Phillips curve.  Following the crisis of 2001, central bank and finance ministry officials 
proposed adoption of to the inflation targeting policy program.  However, finance minister 
Roberto Lavagna made it clear that he understood the policy program as accommodating growth 
and employment.  In the event, bureaucratic infighting and presidential politics undermined this 
initiative.  As a result, the government failed to adopt a coherent policy of any kind, inflation 
rose, and conflict ensued.  Yet this conflict was less within the macroeconomics field than 
between the field and the political leadership.  Evidence of this is the fact that professional 
economists who initially cooperated with the government have repeatedly abandoned it.  In other 
words, since 2001 there has been considerable contention but little professional polarization, as 
debates have not crystallized into a single dimension.   
Globally, as of the mid-2000s, it appeared that the macroeconomic policy field had reached a 
stable settlement.  Of course, as we now know, this was a period of deep complacency before the 
outbreak of the current global financial crisis – a complacency which might actually be a 
characteristic feature of field settlements.36  A full account of this crisis goes well beyond the 
scope of this paper; however, a few implications can be mentioned in closing.   
The Fed’s “heterodox” policies since the crisis are one of the most significant monetary 
experiments in history.  Yet from the perspective of in this paper, this policy experimentation 
represents an incremental modification of the New Keynesian settlement rather than a 
fundamental break.  At the same time, within the US macroeconomic policy field there are 
economists (such as Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz) who have argued forcefully that the Fed 
should do more to combat the great recession.  Some may see this contention as evidence of 
paradigmatic conflict, yet what stands out from the present perspective is the similarity of the 
professional background and causal assumptions of left-leaning economists such as Krugman 
                                                          
35 These claims are institutionalized in the sense that they have become standard boilerplate in the Bank’s reports 
and the speeches of officials. 
36 For example, the concept of fine tuning which prevailed at the peak of the Keynesian settlement also suggests 
complacency about the ability of policymakers to control macroeconomic forces. 
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and more conservative central bankers like Bernanke.37  According to the model developed here, 
this contention is evidence of a professional classification struggle, reflected in Krugman’s 
perception of the field as divided into “freshwater” and “saltwater” camps (Krugman 2009).  
While this suggests rising polarization, dissenters such as Krugman and Stiglitz have not yet 
mobilized a professional movement capable of challenging the existing settlement.  
Nevertheless, this paper has shown that the previous cycle of polarization and contention in the 
macroeconomic policy field took decades to develop, so it remains far too soon to judge the 
effect of the crisis on the macroeconomic policy field. 
 
Conclusion 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to adjudicate between the causal importance of the 
transformation of the macroeconomic policy field and other factors in shaping policy outcomes 
in Latin America.  Rather, the goal is to develop a model of this transformation that aids analysis 
of the diffusion of policy programs from the academic to the political spheres.  Studies of the 
impact of monetarism in the developed countries have reached an impasse (Blyth 2002; Prasad 
2006), partly because defining monetarism as a pro-market worldview makes it impossible to 
isolate the effects of economic ideas from broader ideological factors.  In contrast, 
conceptualizing monetarism as a policy program allows a detailed examination of policy-making 
trends and processes which are often orthogonal to ideological divisions.  From the perspective 
taken here, monetarism – particularly in its less-studied open-economy form – almost certainly 
did have an autonomous impact, but this impact was much more transitory than often suggested. 
Generalizability of the polarization and settlement model of the macroeconomic policy field will 
require further empirical research.  This paper has examined a transnational cycle of polarization 
and settlement spanning the United States and Latin America, but developments elsewhere may 
differ, and may require further theoretical refinement.  In Europe, for example, developments in 
the UK seem to fit the model well, but Germany is very different.  The German Bundesbank – 
and its successor, the European Central Bank – have remained much more committed to causal 
claims consistent with monetarism than the US Federal Reserve or the Bank of England.  On the 
other hand, the creation of the Euro was one of the key policy victories of the early open 
economy school – not because Robert Mundell or others played a direct role, but because the 
causal claims presented by Euro advocates closely resembled those of global monetarism.  The 
German policy field may be closer to monetarism than the US and UK in many respects, but this 
may be less evidence of a shift from Keynesianism to monetarism than evidence of persistent 
monetary conservatism in these countries (much as in Mexico causal claims consistent with 
monetarism represent continuity rather than rupture).  This diversity of causal claims is 
consistent with the notion of field settlement advanced here. 
The polarization and settlement model can also inform debates about professional, policy and 
other fields beyond economics.  One of the most important arguments of this paper is that 
received categories – in this case, “Keynesian,” “monetarist” and so on – need to be treated as 
features of classification struggles, rather than institutionalized groups.  While not wholly new, 
this observation needs to be taken more seriously. Relatedly, the loose coupling between social 
                                                          
37 Like Bernanke, Krugman is tied to the open economy network; his adviser was Rudiger Dornbusch. 
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space and idea space – that is, between the systems of classification that make up the identities of 
actors in fields and the “objective” mapping of positions in a field – deserves closer attention.  
Studies of professional and other fields should pay closer attention to how the categories of 
perception within a field are constructed and how actors mobilize markers of location and 
identity to construct movements and pursue other strategies, rather than assume that these 
categories describe the objective space of a field. 
Finally, the model of cycles of polarization and settlement presented in this paper has broader 
implications for institutionalist and field theory literatures.  One set of debates in the 
institutionalist literature concerns whether change should be seen as gradual and evolutionary or 
ruptural and discontinuous (Campbell 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005).  The model provided 
here mostly takes the “evolutionary” side of this debate, but also captures key aspects of the 
discontinuous view of change by recognizing that episodes of heightened contention and 
polarization are qualitatively distinct from periods of relative settlement.  Moreover, by positing 
that polarization is followed by a “return to the center,” the model accounts for non-linearities 
not captured by evolutionary images of change.   
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Table 1: Overview of the polarization-settlement cycle in monetary economics 
 Time 
period 
Professional 
identities 
Representative 
causal claims 
Policy program Key figures 
Po
la
riz
at
io
n 
Late 
1960s-
1980s 
Monetarism vs. 
Keynesianism/ 
structuralism 
Inflation is 
determined by 
money supply 
(quantity theory 
of money) 
Monetary targets: fix 
constant rate of 
growth of money 
supply 
Milton 
Friedman, 
Robert Lucas 
1970s-
1980s 
Global 
monetarism vs. 
Keynesianism 
and “closed 
economy” 
approaches 
Inflation is 
determined by 
exchange rate  
“Tablitas:” fix 
exchange rate  
Robert 
Mundell; 
designers of 
Southern 
Cone 
stabilization 
plans 
R
et
ur
n 
to
 th
e 
ce
nt
er
 
1980s Neo-
structuralism 
Inflation is 
inertial 
“Heterodox 
stabilization:” use 
wage/price controls 
alongside monetary 
and fiscal 
“orthodoxy” 
Designers of 
heterodox 
stabilization 
plans 
1990s “Open 
economy”  
Inflation 
determined by 
exchange rate; 
“rules” create 
policy 
credibility 
Exchange rate based 
stabilization/bipolar 
view: either fix 
exchange rate or 
target inflation 
Stanley 
Fischer; 
Rudiger 
Dornbusch; 
Michael 
Mussa 
Se
ttl
em
en
t 1990s-
2000s 
New 
Keynesianism 
Policy 
“credibility” 
reduces 
tradeoffs 
 
Inflation targeting; 
Taylor rule 
Ben 
Bernanke; 
John Taylor 
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